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Internal versus External R&D: a Study of  
R&D Choice with Sample Selection 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper extends previous analyses of the choice between internal and external R&D to 
consider the costs of internal R&D.  The underlying hypothesis is that the choice of R&D 
mode is determined by their relative costs.  Rather than merely estimating a reduced form 
probit model for R&D mode, we employ the Heckman two-stage estimator to estimate 
the determinants of internal R&D unit cost (i.e. cost per product innovation) allowing for 
sample selection effects.  Theory indicates that R&D unit cost will be influenced by scale 
issues and by the technological opportunities faced by the firm. We also allow for 
transaction costs arising from the highly uncertain and incomplete nature of contracting 
encountered in research activities. In addition, consideration is given to issues of market 
structure which influence the choice of R&D mode without affecting the unit cost of 
internal or external R&D, i.e. factors affecting the likelihood of dissipation of rents 
accruing from R&D activity. 
 
The model is tested on data from a sample of over 500 UK manufacturing plants which 
have engaged in product innovation.  The key determinants of R&D mode are the scale of 
plant and R&D input, and market structure conditions.  In terms of the R&D cost 
equation, scale factors are again important and have a non-linear relationship with R&D 
unit cost.  Specificities in physical and human capital also affect unit cost, but have no 
clear impact on the choice of R&D mode. There is no evidence of technological 
opportunity affecting either R&D cost or the internal/external decision. 
 
Keywords:  Scale, Market Structure, Cost of R&D, R&D Mode. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Firms engaged in innovation face two important decisions.  First, how much to invest in 
R&D, and second, how to make that investment.  A considerable body of research has 
developed examining the first of these decisions, with the link between R&D inputs and 
innovation outputs considered in terms of an innovation production function (e.g. 
Geroski, 1990; Harris and Trainor, 1995; Love and Roper, 1999).  Less well researched is 
the second important aspect of the R&D decision; whether to conduct  R&D internally or 
to fund R&D conducted elsewhere (i.e. to conduct R&D externally). The evidence 
suggests that this is not a trivial issue, and that there are considerable sectoral variations 
in the extent of external R&D usage. UK figures for 1993 indicate, for example, that of 
£7040m R&D spending by UK manufacturing businesses, £846m (12 per cent) was 
extramural, with this proportion varying by sector from nil to fifty per cent1.  
 
The use of external R&D may have advantages for firms in overcoming the limitations of 
in-house R&D budgets and in gaining access to the economies of scale and scope 
available to specialist research organisations. External R&D links may also be a useful 
method of searching the technological environment in a systematic fashion, possibly 
permitting access to improved technology developed elsewhere (Mowery, 1990; Niosi, 
1999). But the external route also has potential disadvantages. Intellectual property rights 
and appropriability difficulties may make external R&D unattractive, as may the lack of 
appropriate expertise of potential contractors compared to those within a firm’s own 
R&D department. Conversely, under the conditions of asymmetric information which 
will often prevail in the context of research and innovation, a combination of uncertainty 
and principal-agent type arguments may make external R&D seem more attractive, but 
                                                          
1 The extra-mural percentages of total R&D spending for individual UK manufacturing sectors in 1993 
were: Electrical machinery and apparatus, 10.4; Radio, television etc, 4.7; Chemicals, man-made fibres. , 
9.1; Pharmaceuticals, 15.3; Refined petroleum products , 32.1; Aerospace, 14.3; Motor vehicles and parts, 
21.3; Shipbuilding and repairs, 50.0; Other transport equipment, 17.6; Casting of iron and steel, 4.0; Non-
ferrous metals, 0.0; Fabricated metal products, 4.2; Precision instruments, 19.9; Office machinery and 
computers, 4.2; Other machinery, 5.5; Food products and beverages; Tobacco products, 7.9; Textiles, 
clothing and leather products, 4.5; Rubber and plastic products, 6.0; Other non-metallic mineral products, 
3.7; Pulp, paper and paper products; Printing and publishing, 6.1; Furniture; Wood and straw products, 
12.5; Other manufactured goods; Recycling, 9.5. (Source: R&D in UK Business 6th Edition, MO14, Central 
Statistical Office).  
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can lead to problems of monitoring as the agent is able to exaggerate the costs and 
commercial potential of their innovations (Audretsch et al, 1996; Ulset, 1996).  
 
There is an implicit recognition in this research that the optimal internal/external decision 
or combination will vary for different types and sizes of enterprises as the characteristics 
of the firm influence the relative costs of each type of R&D.  There is considerable 
evidence, for example, that R&D is characterised by diminishing returns to scale (Acs 
and Audretsch, 1991; Roper, 1997), although we know little about the relative returns to 
internal and external R&D.  In addition, it is likely that the transaction costs of organising 
external R&D will be higher in smaller firms or those that carry out R&D only on an 
irregular basis. Small firms, or those in a relatively weak market position, may also find it 
more difficult to exploit fully the commercial benefits from successful R&D.  
 
In this paper we draw on the transaction costs literature and on market structure and 
property rights conditions to provide a framework within which we can examine both the 
firm-specific and market aspects of the internal/external decision. Our main focus, 
however, is not on the internal/external decision itself but rather on the factors which 
determine the productivity (and hence cost) of internal R&D.  In much of the existing 
empirical research these costs are implicit in reduced form equations for the probability 
of undertaking internal R&D (Hertog and Thurik, 1993; Audretsch et al, 1996).  Here, 
using techniques more commonly applied in labour market studies (e.g. Dolton et al, 
1989), we are able to estimate an explicit (i.e. structural) model for the determinants of 
the costs of internal R&D2.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines a model of the 
R&D decision based on the factors that influence both the cost of internal versus external 
R&D, and the market conditions facing establishments.  Section 3 describes the dataset 
used for the empirical analysis, and highlights some key differences between 
manufacturing plants using internal and external R&D.  In Section 4 the model of R&D 
                                                          
2 Our analysis does not extend to an examination of the sources of funding for R&D, nor of the effect that 
these may have on the internal/external R&D decision. 
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choice and internal R&D cost is estimated for a sample of UK manufacturing plants, and 
the possible effect of sample selection bias is discussed. Finally, the conclusions are 
presented.  The key findings are that scale and market/appropriability conditions are 
important determinants of the choice of R&D mode, and that there is a strong but non-
linear relationship between scale and the unit cost of internal R&D.  Cost is also 
influenced by specific human assets and the principal production mode of the plant 
 
 
2.  A Model of the R&D Decision 
 
Our starting point here is the recognition that the internal/external decision is similar to 
other decisions considered in the transaction cost literature on the choice between 
different institutional forms, particularly the make-or-buy decision3. In these models, the 
choice of institutional form is governed by their relative cost, where costs are defined to 
include both the ‘production’ costs of the alternatives as well as the costs of organising 
and managing the various alternatives. Suppose, for example, that for any anticipated 
level of innovation outputs the costs of internal (Cf) and external (Cm) R&D are given by: 
 
    Cf = Z + e     (1.1) 
    Cm = Y + u     (1.2) 
 
where Z and Y are (non-mutually exclusive) vectors of the determinants of R&D cost, 
and  and  are coefficient vectors. A typical way to operationalise such a system is to 
express it as a reduced form probabilistic function4, i.e. 
 
   Pr(Cf<Cm) = Pr (e-u<Y- Z).   (2) 
 
                                                          
3 See Shelanski and Klein (1995) for a review of such empirical studies. 
4 This assumes that the revenue implications of  a given product innovation are invariant to the 
internal/external decision employed in any particular case. 
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In terms of the R&D choice decision equation (2) above is incomplete, and must be 
extended to allow for exogenous factors that may affect the choice of R&D mode without 
affecting the cost of R&D.  For example, there are issues of market structure to consider. 
An oligopolistic market structure may discourage some firms from engaging in external 
R&D involving a partner, for fear of leakage and imitation which could threaten the 
firms’ property rights over the results of such R&D. These issues are exogenous to the 
relative costs of internal and external R&D, so that equation (2) becomes: 
 
Pr(Cf<Cm) = Pr (e-u<Y- Z -A)  (3) 
 
where A is a vector of factors shaping firms’ ability to protect and exploit the property 
rights arising from the results of its research. 
 
This reduced form can then be estimated by either probit or logit, which is the estimation 
method favoured by Audretsch et al. However, as Masten et al (1991) point out, this type 
of reduced form estimation has considerable disadvantages. Perhaps the most important is 
the impossibility of identifying the structural coefficient vectors (i.e.  and ) from the 
estimated coefficients of the reduced form model when Y and Z share any common 
elements.  
 
A better approach would be to estimate equations (1.1) and (1.2) as part of a structural 
system. The difficulty here is that while the cost of internal R&D (Cf), or more 
accurately, its unit cost (cf), is usually observable (e.g. as internal R&D expenditure per 
innovation), the cost of external R&D (Cm) is generally not observable.  This need not 
prevent estimation of the structural equations, however. The issue is essentially one of 
selectivity, analogous to the estimation of labour supply functions where wage data are 
available only for those actually in employment (e.g. Dolton et al, 1989). An appropriate 
approach is the standard Heckman two-stage model, in which the reduced form probit 
model of the choice between internal and external R&D is estimated by substituting the 
cost equations (1.1) and (1.2) into equation (3).  In the second stage, the sample selection 
term () is estimated from this model, and the internal R&D cost equation (1.1) is 
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estimated, now suitably corrected for selectivity where it exists. The key advantage of 
this procedure is that it permits the identification of differences in the magnitudes and 
signs of coefficients on the common elements of vectors Y and Z, differences which are 
obscured in the reduced form estimation5. 
 
The cost of R&D is best understood in terms of the innovation production function, 
which requires some suitable measures of the outputs and inputs of such a function. We 
follow the convention in the industrial organisation literature on the innovation 
production function by regarding new products - innovations - as the ultimate output of 
R&D, with inputs represented by R&D expenditure.  At it simplest, such a production 
function has the following form (Geroski, 1990): 
 
    I = R +     (4) 
where I is the number of innovations and R is R&D input.  We are therefore concerned 
with the factors influencing the efficiency with which R&D inputs are turned into 
(product) innovation outputs for a given firm.  In a comprehensive review of the 
literature, Hay and Morris (1991, pp 470-1) identify two principal determinants of R&D 
productivity: scale of operation, and the ‘technological opportunities’ of the firm or 
sector of which it is part.  
 
The most obvious component of scale of operation is the possibility of economies of 
scale in research, arising from inter alia equipment indivisibilities, and from the ability of 
larger research operations to recruit more able staff and accept projects which carry 
higher risks but greater potential rewards. This is measured by total R&D staff within the 
plant. In addition, however, there is the possibility that a given level of R&D expenditure 
may be more effectively managed by a large than a small firm - the idea that innovation 
intensity may vary with firm (or plant) size.  The evidence, however, suggests that while 
there is substantial variation in R&D productivity between plants of different sizes, 
“…the productivity of R&D apparently falls along with firm size. There is no evidence 
                                                          
5 In theory, estimation of the structural form also allows the derivation of the implicit coefficients of the 
external R&D cost function (See, for example, Maddala, 1983, pp 228-9). In practice, however, the 
standard errors which attach to these estimates tend to be too large to give meaningful results. 
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that increasing returns to R&D expenditures in product innovative output exist. Rather, 
… diminishing returns to R&D are the rule.” (Acs and Audretsch, 1991, p. 57). 
Moreover, the work of Acs and Audretsch also suggests that the relationship between 
plant size and R&D productivity is likely to be non-linear when represented by 
employment in the plant and its square.  
 
One other factor often thought to influence the productivity of R&D is whether a plant is 
part of a larger group within a multi-plant company, an important consideration in plant-
level analysis where there is the possibility of centralisation of group R&D resources. 
The extent of any advantage from group membership, however, is likely to be related 
both to the position of the individual subsidiary within the group and to the strategy of the 
group in terms of technological development (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1997). Where there 
is complementarity, in either technological or market terms, between a subsidiary 
company and the rest of a group, access to group resources may reduce the net cost of 
internal R&D.  If, however, subsidiaries possess ‘unique technical capabilities’ or they 
are product specialists, group membership is less likely to be an important R&D cost 
determinant (Egelhoff et al, 1998). In the empirical analysis we include a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the plant is a member of a wider multi-national group of 
companies and zero otherwise.  
 
The concept of technological opportunity is more difficult to operationalise, except to 
make the general point that important differences exist between the average R&D 
intensity of individual sectors. In 1993, for example, R&D spending varied from 21.0 per 
cent of sales in the UK pharmaceuticals sector to 0.1 per cent of sales in the paper and 
paper products and furniture sectors6. More subtly, the work of Audretsch and Feldman 
(1996) and Jaffe (1986) indicates that there can be important positive spillover effects 
from the research of others firms which are in geographical and technological proximity, 
effects which enhance the R&D productivity and hence lower the unit cost of the 
individual establishment’s own research efforts. In the empirical analysis technological 
                                                          
6 Source: Research and Development in UK Business 6th Edition, MO14, Central Statistical Office, Table 
26, p. 51.  
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opportunity is proxied by the average sectoral R&D intensity (i.e. R&D employment as a 
proportion of total employment).  
 
From this discussion of R&D productivity it is but a short step to the internal R&D cost 
function (equation 1.1).  From the innovation production function described above, 
productivity is the number of innovations per unit of R&D input. An obvious measure of 
Cf, the total cost of internal R&D, is therefore total firm expenditure on R&D; since the 
ultimate output of R&D is innovation, unit cost can therefore be expressed as R&D 
expenditure per product innovation. 
 
There is, however, a further set of costs which are directly relevant to the decision on 
which form of R&D the firm is most likely to adopt.  These are the transaction costs 
involved in managing internal R&D versus those incurred in engaging in contractual 
research agreements with other parties. The literature on transaction costs emphasises the 
problems of bargaining and of incomplete contracts in market transacting, with 
considerable weight being given to the existence of appropriable quasi-rents which may 
arise from transaction-specific investments under conditions of uncertainty (Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979). By their very nature, contracts 
involving R&D tend to be highly incomplete because of the uncertainty of the research 
process, and may be characterised by substantial investment in both physical and human 
specific capital. Teece (1988) highlights the problem of ‘lock-in’ under these conditions: 
because of the tacit knowledge acquired by a contracting party in any external R&D 
arrangement, there may be very high transaction costs to incur should the other party seek 
to terminate the contract for reasons of under-performance. What is more, the highly 
uncertain nature of R&D makes satisfactory contract completion difficult to define, 
possibly leading to a preference for internal over external R&D even where rent-seeking 
opportunism is not a major threat (Love, 1997).  This view is supported by Audretsch et 
al (1996) who find evidence that the existence of firm-specific human capital is 
negatively related to the use of external R&D.  In the estimation, indicators of the 
predominant type of production method in the establishment are used to proxy the degree 
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of capital specificity in the plant while the proportion of graduate employees proxies the 
specificity of the firm’s human capital.  
 
The implied form of the internal unit cost equation is therefore as follows (definitions in  
Table 1): 
 
cf = 0+1Rdemp+2Size+3Srdint+4Grads+5Sbatch+6Lbatch+7MNE+   (5) 
 
Following the discussion above, the sign expectation on the coefficients are 3,5,6, 
7<0, 4>0.  Following the discussion above regarding the effects of scale on unit R&D 
cost, 1,2<0 implies economies of scale 1,2>0 implies diseconomies of scale. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Equation (5) is the estimating version of equation (1.1). In order to derive an estimating 
version of the reduced-form probit equation (3) we consider factors which, although they 
do not necessarily influence the relative costs of the internal and external modes, 
nevertheless exert a direct influence on the choice between internal and external R&D.  
These issues revolve around a firm’s ability to protect and exploit the property rights 
arising from the results of its research.  All firms have reason to fear the possible 
dissipation of rents which may result from disclosure of R&D findings by a research 
partner or subcontractor, especially where the research is tacit knowledge embedded in 
individuals (Teece, 1988).  However, this will be more of an issue for some firms than for 
others.  In order to protect their favourable positions, firms in highly concentrated 
markets, especially those firms which themselves have a high market share, will be 
particularly keen to prevent or delay the imitation by rivals which often accompanies 
innovation.  One way of doing this is to carry out research in-house, lessening the risk of 
disclosure to rivals.  As Hertog and Thurik (1993) state, “Internal R&D may give a firm a 
valuable lead time over its rivals in a concentrated market” (p. 283).  The same study 
finds evidence that in Dutch manufacturing high levels of sectoral concentration are 
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associated with a low relative incidence of external R&D at the firm level7. Finally, there 
is the issue of firm growth, with the hypothesis that high-growth firms are less likely to 
collude, and so are more likely to engage in internal R&D (Hertog & Thurik, p. 284). In 
the estimation, measures of industrial concentration, minimum efficient scale, and the 
market share and growth rate of the individual plant represent market conditions which 
directly influence the choice of R&D mode.  The estimating version of equation (3) is 
thus: 
 
Pr(Internal)= 0+ 1Rdemp+2Size+3Srdint+4Grads+5Sbatch 
+6Lbatch+7MNE+8CR5+9MES+10Share+11Growth+  (6) 
 
The expected coefficient signs on the additional variables are 8,9,10,11>0. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
The main plant level data source used in the estimation is the Product Development 
Survey (PDS) which was originally conducted in 1995. This sought information on 
various aspects of R&D and product innovation from over 8,300 UK manufacturing 
businesses, selected to be representative of the size and sectoral distribution of UK 
manufacturing8.  The final response rate was 20.6%, giving a usable sample of 1,722 
plants. Of these plants, 968 (56 per cent) had introduced at least one new or improved 
product in the previous three years and were regarded as ‘innovators’. Respondents to the 
PDS also provided information on R&D expenditure and employment in 1993 and 
indicated whether R&D was conducted in-plant. 
 
                                                          
7 A similar negative, albeit weak , relationship between industry concentration and external R&D is also 
reported by Audretsch et al (see, in particular, their estimated coefficients on the concentration ratio terms).  
8 An indication of the representativeness of the survey was obtained by comparing survey-based and 
official figures on UK R&D employment.  In 1993, the official estimates of R&D employment in UK 
manufacturing was 119,000 (2.8% of the workforce); evidence from the PDS suggested a figure of 
117,000.  Full details of the survey, and descriptive findings, can be found in Roper et al (1996). 
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Analysis of this type involves comparing the output of R&D across plants and across 
industries. These may vary widely in terms of the technological sophistication of each 
innovation, their degree of originality (i.e. product improvements versus fundamentally 
new products), and in terms of the revenue impact on the plant making the innovation.  
Commenting on the problems inherent in this, Hall (1994) argues: 
 “We should separate product from process innovations and identify those which 
are major departures as opposed to modest modifications. But this always 
involves subjective judgement and may ignore the crucial difference between 
innovations of major economic importance but little technological novelty, or of 
great technological achievement but little economic value.” (p. 151) 
 
The latter part of Hall’s argument is of considerable importance, especially given the 
evidence from Audretsch (1995) that almost 90% of commercially significant innovations 
in the United States involve little or no technological advance.  The present  study 
expressly views innovation as a business phenomenon rather than a technological 
phenomenon.  The term ‘innovation’ is therefore restricted to product innovations, 
meaning new or improved products which were potentially of some commercial 
significance to the responding plant.  In terms of Hall’s quotation above, we have 
therefore erred on the side of ‘economic importance but little technological novelty’, on 
the grounds that we are principally concerned with the economics rather than the 
technology of new product development and R&D modal choice.  The analysis is 
restricted to innovating plants: the innovation decision is not explicitly modelled9. 
 
Analysis carried out at the plant level rather than the firm level has some advantages.  
Although strategic decisions are likely to be carried out at firm level, they are 
implemented at the level of the individual plant, and are likely to be based on the product 
market situation faced by those individual plants.  This is especially true of large multi-
product enterprises. Thus a firm may choose to use an internal R&D strategy at one plant 
and an external R&D strategy at another in a different product division which is facing a 
                                                          
9 See Love and Roper (1999) for an estimation of the innovation determinants for this data set.  The 
empirical analysis excludes those plants which undertook R&D but produced no innovations during the 
period in question. These plants account for 6.8% of the total sample. 
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quite different set of market circumstances, a subtlety which may be missed in firm-level 
analysis.  The possibility that there may be beneficial R&D spillovers from being a 
member of a group is nevertheless explicitly allowed for in the MNE dummy, while the 
sectoral R&D intensity variable allows for the variations in technological opportunity 
effects inherent in cross-sectional analysis. 
 
Table 2 summarises the basic PDS data for plants undertaking external R&D only and 
those undertaking internal R&D either with or without external R&D10,11.  Although not 
directly comparable, the proportion of companies undertaking external R&D only (9.3 
per cent) is relatively similar to the external proportion (12 per cent) of all UK 
manufacturing R&D in 1993.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Plants undertaking only external R&D were on average significantly smaller than those 
having some internal R&D, in terms of both employment and market share (Table 2). 
This size difference may simply reflect the general tendency for larger firms to undertake 
more R&D (Audretsch, 1995; Love and Roper, 1999) but it may also reflect the tendency 
for larger plants to incorporate additional transactions internally (Audretsch et al, 1996). 
On average, plants undertaking some R&D internally had 14 R&D staff although, as the 
large standard deviation suggests, plants’ level of R&D employment varied widely. It is 
also likely that the existence of internal R&D in this group of plants accounts, at least in 
part, for their higher level of graduate employment.  
 
In other respects, such as growth performance, the type of production undertaken, 
sectoral concentration and industry MES, there was relatively little difference between 
the two groups. Notably, however, the proportion of each group of plants that were part 
                                                          
10 The reason for presenting the data in this way is a consequence of the dependent variable used in the 
probit estimation, and discussed in the next section. 
11 Analysis is restricted to those 507 innovating plants which provided full information on all estimating 
variables.  On all variables except employment, Mann-Whitney U tests indicate that the sample firms were 
statistically indistinguishable from the remaining 461 innovators which provided partial information (mean 
values of 263 and 300 employees respectively).  
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of MNEs was slightly higher for those undertaking external only (21 per cent) than for 
those undertaking some internal R&D (17 per cent). This suggests that on balance the 
traditional view of the MNE where R&D is a centralised activity still predominates over 
the more decentralised strategy envisaged in the literature on subsidiary development 
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). This is important from the point of view of innovation in 
that the evidence suggests that lack of an internal R&D capacity is likely to reduce 
plants’ capacity to innovate. Indeed, as Love and Roper (1999) point out, once the 
positive influences of technology transfer, networking and larger average size are 
accounted for, foreign-owned plants in the UK are less innovative than their British-
owned equivalents. 
 
Sectoral R&D intensity also differed substantially between the two groups with plants in 
more innovation intensive industries less likely to rely on external R&D (Table 2). This is 
consistent with the results of Audretsch et al (1996) and Veugelers (1997) which 
suggested that in Dutch high-tech industries internal R&D was necessary, and seen as 
complementary to external R&D. In low-tech industries, Audretsch et al suggest that 
external R&D may act as a substitute for internal R&D activity. In summary, only around 
a tenth of R&D performing plants in the sample rely on external R&D only. These plants 
tend to be smaller, concentrated in less R&D intensive sectors, and more likely to be part 
of MNEs than those plants also undertaking internal R&D.  
 
The mean value of R&D unit cost (i.e. average cost per innovation) among those plants 
employing internal R&D was £55,946.  However, the distribution is highly skewed, with 
one third of responding plants having unit costs of less than £5000, and half having unit 
costs of less than £10,000.  Less than 12% of sample firms had average R&D costs per 
innovation above £100,000. 
 
4.   Model Estimation 
 
Our initial aim was to identify those factors that are important in determining plants’ 
‘make or buy’ decision in terms of R&D as a input into the subsequent modelling of the 
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cost of internal R&D.  For plants undertaking some R&D, there are three possible 
options; internal only, external only or a combination of both internal and external R&D. 
Initial modelling using multinomial choice models indicated that there were no statistical 
differences between plants undertaking only internal R&D and those undertaking both 
internal and external R&D.12   This permitted the use of a simpler modelling approach 
with a binary dependent variable reflecting the groupings in Table 2, i.e. an 
internal/external-only split where the ‘internal’ grouping includes a number of plants 
which were also undertaking both types of R&D.  ‘External’ is here defined as a situation 
in which all of a plant’s R&D activities were carried out either by arm’s length 
contractual agreement or by collaborative agreement which involved no direct use of 
R&D staff at the plant in question.13  
 
Table 3 reports a number of Probit models of the internal/external-only decision. In all 
cases the overall 2 is highly significant, and the ability of the probit estimates to 
distinguish between the two groups is very high, correctly predicting on average 89% of 
external R&D-only plants and 98% of internal R&D plants. There is a strong relationship 
between plant size, numbers of R&D staff, and the choice of R&D mode. This 
relationship is complex, however, with the probability that a plant will engage in some 
internal R&D varying quadratically with respect to R&D employment and in cubic 
fashion with respect to plant size. In terms of plant size, this suggests ceteris paribus that 
the probability that a plant will have internal R&D declines until reaching a turning point 
at 627 employees and then increases until the second turning point at around 5600 
employees14. This plant size effect is offset, however, by a similar but inverse effect 
relating to the plant’s number of R&D employees15. We read little into the latter result: it 
                                                          
12 See Veugelers and Cassiman (1999: 75) for a similar discussion in relation to Belgian data. 
13 Note that this definition of ‘external’ excludes R&D carried out by another plant within the same firm: 
the vast majority of plants which did have such a relationship also had some internal R&D capacity and/or 
had external R&D links.  Group spillover effects are allowed for by the MNE dummy. 
14 Both of these turning points are within the observed range for the sample, as are the turning points for 
R&D employment discussed below. 
15 The turning point implied by the coefficients on R&D employment (637) is very similar to that of the 
plant size coefficients. This means that the vast majority of plants in the sample, which have less than 637 
R&D staff, are operating on that portion of the curve which implies an increasing probability of internal 
R&D as R&D employment increases. This suggests that the probability of a plant engaging in some 
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should be borne in mind that firms undertaking only external R&D have, by definition, 
no R&D employees, and this variable is included principally for the estimated cost 
equation which follows.  Other plant-level variables included in the probit models 
perform poorly, with graduate numbers, and type of production having little effect on the 
probability that the plant will undertake some R&D internally.  There is also little 
evidence, from the estimated coefficients on sectoral R&D intensity, that the extent of 
technological opportunity in a plants’ industry has any significant effect on its choice of 
R&D mode.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
More interesting are the coefficients on the measures of industry concentration (CR5), 
minimum efficient scale (MES) and market share, designed to capture plants’ ability to 
exploit the benefits of innovation outputs. Market concentration has a significant effect, 
increasing the probability that a plant will undertake some R&D internally. The negative 
and significant coefficient on MES may at first seem surprising.  However, the Comanor-
Wilson proxy is positively related to industry size inequalities; in conjunction with the 
CR5 result, this implies that firms in highly concentrated sectors where the size 
distribution of competitors is fairly equal are more likely to favour internal R&D, in line 
with concerns over property rights under such conditions. High plant market share also 
increases the likelihood of internal R&D. 
 
In general, these results suggest that the choice of R&D mode in UK manufacturing is 
dominated by scale and market structure effects. The internal characteristics of the plant 
and its potential relationship to other group plants seem relatively unimportant. Hertog 
and Thurik (1993), who use a range of industry level explanatory variables in their 
analysis, reach essentially similar conclusions, although Audretsch et al (1996) do 
identify significant effects on R&D mode from plants’ capital intensity and the skill 
composition of their workforce.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
internal R&D varies quadratically with R&D intensity itself, increasing initially before falling beyond the 
637 employee turning point. 
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The significance of plant scale and market structure on the choice of R&D mode suggests 
the possibility of self-selection in terms of the group of companies undertaking internal 
R&D. If this element of selectivity is significant, direct estimation of an internal R&D 
cost equation is likely to lead to biased results (see for example, Greene, 1997, p. 982). It 
is therefore necessary to allow explicitly for the possibility of some selection bias in the 
estimation of the internal R&D cost equation (see Maddala, 1983, pp 257-290 for a 
general discussion). This is done using the Heckman two-stage estimator, and Table 4 
reports four such models estimated for those plants undertaking some internal R&D (i.e. 
taking the value 1 in the probit equations in Table 3), where the dependent variable is 
R&D unit cost (i.e. the ratio of total R&D spending to the number of product 
innovations).   
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The key finding is once again the importance of scale, both in terms of plant size and in 
terms of numbers of R&D staff: internal R&D unit costs increase with both plant size and 
the scale of plants’ R&D operation. As before, however, these relationships are non-
linear with the effect of plant size on R&D unit costs starting to fall beyond 780 
employees, and the effect of R&D scale on R&D unit cost starting to fall beyond 870 
R&D employees. Our results for plant size parallel much other recent work which 
suggests that there is a quadratic or inverse relationship between innovation intensity and 
firm/plant size (Acs and Audretsch, 1988; Love and Roper, 1999), and that diminishing 
returns to R&D are prevalent over a wide range of firm sizes (Acs and Audretsch, 1991). 
Taken together with the Probit results, this suggests an interesting pattern with respect to 
internal R&D (cost) and plant size. Once a threshold plant size of around 630 employees 
is reached, increased plant size increases the likelihood of internal R&D; however, 
initially this is at a sub-optimal level with diseconomies of scale.  Only once the higher 
plant-size threshold of 780 employees is reached are scale economies achieved in terms 
of effective management of research projects.  
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In terms of scale economies arising directly from the scale of plants’ R&D operations 
(i.e. equipment indivisibilities, acceptance of higher-risk projects etc.), the estimated 
coefficients for R&D personnel indicate that achieving falling unit cost involves crossing 
a very high personnel threshold of over 800, an investment so large for the individual 
plant or firm that economies will be achieved by only a tiny proportion of all plants. 
Some care should be taken in interpreting the results for R&D personnel, because these 
data refer to total R&D employment, while the dependent variable relates only to product 
innovation.  This may have resulted in some upward bias in the threshold required to 
achieve scale economies in terms of R&D personnel, although the extent of any such bias 
is uncertain 
 
Unlike the Probit equations for the probability of undertaking internal R&D, R&D unit 
cost is influenced relatively strongly by other plant characteristics. A higher proportion of 
graduates in the workforce, for example, has a positive effect on internal R&D unit costs. 
This implies that in terms of cost per innovation, graduate employees are more expensive 
than other employee groups. The production characteristics of the plant also have a 
significant impact on R&D unit cost, with dummy variables for both small and large 
batch production having consistent negative effects relative to plants undertaking 
continuous production. Despite the hypothesis that capital-intensive plants are more 
likely to engage in external R&D16, it may not appear obvious that there is any immediate 
link between plants’ production operations and the cash cost of internal R&D. In the 
estimation, however, we measure R&D unit cost per new product or product change. As 
continuous production systems tend to be inflexible relative to batch oriented production 
systems, product changes may be less costly and more frequent in the latter type of 
production system, thus reducing R&D unit cost.  
 
The internal R&D cost equations suggest three other points. First, the positive coefficient 
on the sectoral R&D intensity variable provides no support for the hypothesis that R&D 
cost in a plant will be reduced by spillover effects from R&D undertaken by other firms 
                                                          
16 Because capital-intensive plants are more likely to produce relatively standardised products that can only 
be copied with difficulty by imitators (Audretsch et al, 1996). 
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within the sector.  Secondly, the coefficients on the group/MNE dummy vary in sign and 
are statistically insignificant suggesting that any ‘internal’ spillover effects on R&D cost 
are minimal. The insignificance of this coefficient is potentially important, as this dummy 
variable is designed to offset (at least partially) any distortion of the R&D figures induced 
by the study being plant rather than firm based. Thirdly, despite the apparent potential for  
selectivity effects noted earlier, the sample selection parameter () is consistently 
insignificant. This suggests that there is no bias in the estimates of R&D cost arising from 
the fact that not all plants perform R&D internally, and that OLS estimation of R&D unit 
cost can safely be undertaken. As would be anticipated under these circumstances, the 
OLS results are very similar to those of the sample selection models (Table 5).  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the simple reduced-form estimation of the 
choice between internal and external R&D and examine the underlying costs of internal 
R&D.  The analysis was informed by the literature on scale and technological opportunity 
as determinants of the cost of R&D, and by issues of property rights and transaction costs 
developed from the new institutional economics literature. Clearly there are limitations in 
performing cross-sectional analysis of this type. For example, the relationship between 
R&D expenditure and innovation is likely to have a time component, with the stock as 
well as the flow of R&D having some effect.  Nevertheless, there are consistent and 
robust results arising from the econometric estimation. 
 
One of the key findings is that relationship between scale and the internal/external R&D 
decision is quite complex, much more so than is suggested by the analysis of e.g. Hertog 
and Thurik (1993) who are able to conclude only that small enterprises are more likely to 
engage in external R&D.  Our results indicate that this decision is mediated through the 
relationship between size, R&D inputs and R&D unit cost, and that this relationship is 
non-linear.  In order to achieve economies of scale in internal R&D, plants need not only 
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be of beyond medium size, but employ a very large complement of research staff in situ.  
As indicated in the previous section, the scale coefficients must be interpreted with 
caution, but our results do complement previous research which finds that decreasing 
returns to scale are common in R&D (Acs and Audretsch, 1991).  Although we are in no 
position to determine why this is the case over such a wide range of R&D inputs, one 
obvious possibility relates to the nature of the R&D function itself.  R&D covers a wide 
range of activities from fundamental research to relatively routine development work.  
Conceivably, the relatively high risk basic research is being undertaken in a relatively 
few large plants which have the research and financial capacity to do so, while most other 
plants carry out mainly development work. Since basic research carries greater risk of 
failure (in terms of no innovative output) this may lead to larger plants effectively 
appearing to have relatively higher R&D unit costs, especially when innovation is 
defined broadly as in the present study.  This would also help explain the pattern found 
here and in much previous research of an inverse relationship between plant/firm size and 
innovation intensity (i.e. innovations per employee).   
 
The empirical results also strongly suggest that, regardless of the internal R&D cost 
conditions faced by the individual plant, market structure conditions have an important 
role to play in the organisation of R&D.  Plants with a relatively high market share 
operating in concentrated industrial sectors are more likely to maintain an internal R&D 
capacity, especially where size inequalities are modest and so rivalry may be expected to 
be intense. This is in line with the hypothesis that plants experiencing these conditions 
are particularly keen to protect the property rights arising from their research, which 
might otherwise be dissipated where collaboration is employed. Specificities in physical 
and human capital also affect unit cost, but have no clear impact on choice of R&D 
mode. We find no clear evidence of technological opportunity affecting R&D cost or the 
internal/external decision. 
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.Table 1: Variables in Unit Cost and R&D Mode Equations 
 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Cf R&D expenditure per innovation Survey 
Rdemp R&D staff (number) Survey 
Size  Plant employment Survey 
Srdint  Sectoral R&D intensity Weighted average of plant 
R&D/employment ratios (3-digit level) 
Grads Graduates in employment (%) Survey 
Sbatch Small batch production dummy Survey 
Lbatch Large batch production dummy Survey 
MNE MNE group plant dummy Survey 
CR5 5-firm concentration ratio Census of Production (3-digit level) 
MES Comanor-Wilson MES proxy Census of Production (3-digit level) 
Share Plant market share Survey and Census of Production 
Growth Plant sales growth Survey 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 External  
R&D Only  
N=47 
 Internal 
 R&D 
N=460 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
A. R&D Cost Factors   
R&D expenditure per innovation (£000) 0.00 0.00 55.94 172.17 
Plant Size (employment) 211.23 271.38 268.19 829.60 
R&D Staff (number) 0.00 0.00 14.39 79.88 
Sectoral R&D Intensity  2.97 2.95 3.47 2.59 
Graduate Share of Workforce (%) 6.51 6.23 8.88 9.89 
Small Batch Production (%) 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.50 
Large Batch Production (%) 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.47 
MNE plant (%) 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.38 
  
  
B. Structure Indicators   
Market Share 0.45 0.81 0.72 2.51 
Five-firm Concentration Ratio 29.86 18.34 30.60 18.25 
Minimum Efficient Scale Indicator 1.81 2.47 1.65 2.07 
Turnover Growth 0.09 0.20 0.08 0.18 
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Table 3: Binomial Probit Models for Undertaking Internal R&D 
  
   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
   
Constant -0.837 -0.956 -0.839  -0.783 
(0.659) (0.696) (0.661)  (0.663) 
      
A. R&D Cost Determinants      
      
R&D Employment 3.072 ** 3.169 ** 3.081 ** 3.103 **
(0.531) (0.544) (0.534)  (0.544) 
R&D Employment Squared -24.897 ** -24.168 **  
  (4.411)  (4.324)   
Plant Size (Empl) -0.019 ** -0.021 ** -0.019 ** -0.0205 **
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) 
Plant Size Squared 0.151 ** 0.165 ** 0.151 ** 0.181 **
(0.050) (0.053) (0.051)  (0.059) 
Plant Size Cubed   -0.002 **
  0.001 
Sectoral R&D Intensity -0.037 -0.023 -0.037  -0.039 
(0.129) (0.129) (0.129)  (0.130) 
Graduate Share Of Workforce 0.058 0.0505 0.057  -0.060 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)  (0.039) 
Small Batch Production -0.561 -0.539 -0.561  -0.591 
(0.459) (0.459) (0.459)  (0.463) 
Large Batch Production -0.431 -0.286 -0.431  -0.456 
(0.448) (0.462) (0.449)  (0.452) 
MNE Plant 0.664    
(0.595)    
      
B. Structure Indicators      
      
Concentration Ratio (CR5) 0.069 ** 0.071 ** 0.070 ** 0.071 **
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.025) 
Minimum Efficient Scale -0.494 ** -0.511 ** -0.495 ** -0.501 **
(0.193) (0.196) (0.193)  (0.195) 
Market Share 0.753 ** 0.838 ** 0.754 ** 0.771 **
(0.371) (0.384) (0.372)  (0.376) 
Turnover Growth  -0.906 -0.831 -0.907  -0.957 
 (0.812) (0.843) (0.813)  (0.818) 
    
N 507 507 507  507 
Log Likelihood -29.40 -28.69 -29.35  -29.29 
Equation 2(.) 254.26 255.67 254.35  254.48 
 
Note:  The dependent variable equals one when the firm engages in internal R&D 
regardless of whether or not it engages in any additional external R&D. Figures in 
brackets are standard errors. ** denotes that a coefficient is significant at the five percent 
level. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level.   
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Table 4: Sample Selection Models for the Unit Cost of Internal R&D 
 
   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
   
Constant -33.423 * -5.584 -4.622 -8.114  
 (19.884)  (18.711)  (18.574)  (21.665)  
R&D Employment 1.032 ** 4.595 ** 4.580 ** 1.266 ** 
 (0.153) (0.474)  (0.472)  (0.172)  
R&D Employment Squared -26.48 ** -26.316 **   
  (3.379)  (3.35)    
Plant Size (Empl) 0.384 ** 0.215 ** 0.221 ** 0.157   
 (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.051)  (0.101)  
Plant Size Squared -1.593 ** -1.391 ** -1.412 ** 1.379   
 (0.261) (0.247) (0.241) (1.132)  
Plant Size Cubed -0.086 ** 
  (0.031)  
Sectoral R&D Intensity 6.787 ** 2.910 2.844 6.006 * 
 (3.116)  (2.902)  (2.897)  (3.095)  
Graduate Share  2.827 ** 1.755 ** 1.768 ** 2.745 ** 
 (0.806) (0.75)  (0.750)  (0.797)  
Small Batch Production -20.951 -26.514 * -26.862 * -24.989  
 (16.687)  (15.329)  (15.302)  (16.567)  
Large Batch Production -52.996 ** -56.51 ** -56.905 ** -53.542 ** 
 (17.872) (16.408) (16.378) (17.693)  
MNE Plant 6.958 -1.776  
 (19.269) (20.934)  
 -44.410 -10.053 -12.625 -31.733  
 (57.512) (51.711) (53.283) (57.284)  
   
N 326 326 326 326  
F(.) 25.32 29.92 33.33 21.36  
Log Likelihood  -2055.4 -2026.0 -2026.6 -2050.5  
 
Note:  The dependent variable is the unit cost of internal R&D, i.e. the cost of internal 
R&D per product innovation. Estimation is restricted to those companies undertaking 
internal R&D only. Figures in brackets are standard errors. ** denotes that a coefficient is 
significant at the five percent level. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level.   
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Table 5: OLS Regressions for the Unit Cost of Internal R&D 
 
         
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
    
Constant -35.869 * -6.096 -5.246 -9.525  
 (19.861)  (18.815)  (18.644)  (21.843)  
R&D Employment 1.029 ** 4.601 ** 4.587 ** 1.267 ** 
 (0.154) (0.481)  (0.4784)  (0.175)  
R&D Employment Squared -26.54 ** -26.377 **   
  (3.421)  (3.387)    
Plant Size (Empl) 0.382 ** 0.215 ** 0.220 ** 0.152  
 (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.0517)  (0.102)  
Plant Size Squared -1.582 ** -1.388 ** -1.409 ** 1.425  
 (0.264) (0.251) (0.243) (1.147)  
Plant Size Cubed -0.087 ** 
  (0.032)  
Sectoral R&D Intensity 7.022 ** 2.959 2.901 6.163 ** 
 (3.138)  (2.931)  (2.928)  (3.130)  
Graduate Share  2.868 ** 1.761 ** 1.777 ** 2.772 ** 
 (0.813)  (0.761)  (0.759)  (0.807)  
Small Batch Production -20.995 * -26.529 * -26.888 * -25.067  
 (16.890)  (15.57)  (15.517)  (16.822)  
Large Batch Production -52.664 ** -56.432 ** -56.819 ** -53.308 ** 
 (18.085) (16.661) (16.604) (17.962)  
MNE Plant  7.126 -1.943  
 (19.551) (21.272)  
   
Adjusted R2 0.375 0.472 0.473 0.386  
F(.) 28.89 33.35 37.6 23.75  
Log Likelihood -2060.2 -2031.6 -2031.7 -2056.3  
   
 
Note:  The dependent variable is the unit cost of internal R&D, i.e. the cost of internal 
R&D per product innovation. Estimation is restricted to those companies undertaking 
internal R&D only. Figures in brackets are standard errors. ** denotes that a coefficient is 
significant at the five percent level. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level.   
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